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Legal Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Analysis
of The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
Todd Barnet*
INTRODUCTION

In The Palmyra, in 1827, the United States Supreme Court
endorsed the judicially-created in rem personification fiction of the
"guilty object."' Writing for the Court, Justice Joseph Story held
that a Spanish pirate ship could be put on trial for a crime, stating
that the personification fiction was a settled principle in the law of
admiralty.2 The pirate vessel itself was put on trial as a respondent
"person" in the action in admiralty. Since that time, the legal fiction
of personificatiorl has become an important part of the law of both
civil and criminal forfeiture, accepted by the United States Supreme
3
Court as a legal reality.
How did we get to this seemingly irrational, fanciful conclusion?
And what has been the effect on United States forfeiture law particularly on the civil side of the court? This article surveys the
influence of legal fictions in the law of civil and criminal forfeiture.
It examines the early attempts to systematize the concept and
philosophy of what constitutes a legal fiction. This exploration of
the historical foundations of the legal fiction lends itself to a
critical analysis of the various species of legal fictions legislative, judicial, and historical - used in the United States
today.
Part I analyzes legal fictions, from Rome before the birth of
Jesus Christ to the present, to ascertain why a court accepts as
true that which is not. The so-called "civilian" definition of a legal
* Associate Professor of Law, Lubin School of Business, Legal Studies and Taxation,
Pace University; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; A.B., University of Southern California.
Professor Barnet also practices criminal defense law in New York.
1. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827).
2. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14-15.
3. LEONARD W. LEvy, A LICENSE TO STEAL THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 50-51 (1996); see
also Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (stating
that "[ilt is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held
guilty."); J.W. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 506-07 (1921). See generally
Mark S. Roy, United States Federal Forfeiture Law: Current Status and Implications of
Expansion, 69 Miss. LJ. 373 (1999).
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fiction - developed and refined by medieval lawyers and scholars
in Europe - proves to be the most organized and clearly defined. 4
The civilian approach allows the intimate study of the structure of
the fiction.
By thoroughly exploring the history and definitions of a legal
fiction, we can examine the utility of these fictions. In particular, a
consideration of some of the legal areas in which the concept has
advanced, or impeded, important constitutional principles, including
bedrock principles such as due process of law, freedom from
double jeopardy, and freedom from self-incrimination as well as
other valuable rights, such as private property and privacy, is
helpful in understanding the benefits and detriments of the modem
legal fiction.
When used sparingly and on a limited, short-term, equitable
basis, there have been substantial benefits - like the equitable
benefits achieved in early Roman law. However, our courts and
legislature have perpetuated legal fictions that are cruel and
unusual, particularly in the "War on Drugs," with little or no
thought or analysis of a definition of the fiction.5 Attempting to
illuminate the evolution of the modem legal fiction, Part II traces
the development of the deodand from a medieval religious sacrifice
of property that caused harm to a modem revenue-generating
device. The deodand and other forfeiture devices have developed
hand-in-hand with fiction, often at the expense of individual
liberties. Relying upon these dubious precedents, modem laws such
as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
and the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 evaded the
individual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution by using civil
forfeiture to strike at alleged criminals - with the attendant
reduction in constitutional protections - rather than trying the
6
perpetrators in a criminal trial.
Although the forfeiture-fiction continues, the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, first introduced by Congressman
Henry Hyde in 1993 and finally enacted in April 2000, curtails its
4.

For a complete analysis of the roots of the legal fiction, see generally PIERRE JJ.

OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE

(1975).

5. LEvy, supra note 3, at 102.43. Levy documents various abuses of the civil forfeiture
laws, like the district attorney who drove a BMW, seized from drug dealers, as his official
car. Id. at 124.
6. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1994); Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994).
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growth and reach.7 Part III analyzes the changes brought about by
that act. Notwithstanding, because legal fiction survives in the new
law, Part III closely examines where it exists and why.
Finally, I will make some modest predictions for the future of
fiction-forfeiture. It is my hope that by proceeding with this
dissection of the organization and definition of terms, the worst
excesses of the forfeiture laws can once and for all be exposed and
8
avoided.
I.

A.

LEGAL FICTIONS

The Evolution of the Legal Fiction:
Roman, Civilian and Modern Definitions

Jeremy Bentham referred to "the pestilential breath of Fiction,"
while in almost the next breath admitting that "with respect to...
fictions, there once was a time, perhaps, when they had their use."9
But how does one know what a legal fiction is and, more
specifically, whether it is "good" or "bad"?
Although the Romans employed legal fictions extensively, they
did not attempt to analyze their use of fictions, nor did they
systematize legal fictions or ever carefully define the term. 10
Nevertheless, Roman law has served as a foundation and catalyst
for later thought on the nature of the legal fiction." The Romans
believed that fictions were to be used sparingly and only to achieve
an equitable result; if the use would yield an unjust result, it was
discouraged.
The "civilians" - medieval lawyers and scholars - were the first
to fully define the term and to see the "good" in the concept, while
recognizing the potential for serious abuse at the expense of the
people. Medieval lawyers and scholars consciously employed the
Roman use of fictions in formulating their own positive law. 12 By
the fourteenth century, the civilian scholar Cinus de Pistoia had
considerably refined the definition of a legal fiction, stating: fictio
7. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000).
8. "Legal philosophy has tended to disregard the institutional processes . . . legal
scholars have talked about the rules . . . rather than about 'the law' itself. A general
antipathy to metaphysics has barred any inquiry into the nature of 'reality.'" LoN L FULLER,
LEGAL FICTIONS xi (1967).
9. Id. at 2 (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 WORKS 235, 268 (John Bowring ed., 1843)).
10. OLIVIER, supra note 4, at 5, 12.
11. Id. at 12.
12. Id. at 6.
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est in re certa contraria veritati pro veritate assumptio, an
assumption deliberately and consciously made, contrary to the
facts and irrebutable. Bartolus de Saxoferrato, a post-civilian,
improved this definition by narrowing it to include only a false
assumption that "is lawful or has a lawful effect." 13 Bartolus applied
the fiction to the concept of legal personality, rejecting, for
example, the then-common acceptance of the legal personality of a
university as a fact, insisting instead that the legal person was, in
14
reality, a fiction.
Professor P.J.J. Olivier, examining the civilian definition of the
legal fiction almost 500 years later, opined that:
[a legal fiction is] an assumption of fact deliberately, lawfully
and irrebutably made contrary to the facts proven or probable
in a particular case, with the object of bringing a particular
legal rule into operation or explaining a legal rule, the
assumption being permitted by law or employed in legal
science.15
Fictions, Olivier argued, can be useful as intellectual tools that help
16
us "circumpass difficult obstacles in the path of thought."
However, Olivier also suggested that by the eighteenth century in
Europe, "all remembrance . . . of the elements of the fiction
concept seem to have sunk into oblivion. Jurists seem to be
17
struggling to define and analyse [sic] the fiction de novo."
Moreover, according to Olivier, Anglo-American jurists have also
blindly follow the Roman conception of the legal fiction, without
any consideration of its philosophic underpinnings.
By 1773, the traditional fiction definitions gave way to new
formulations, like that provided by T. Boey in his legal dictionary,
Woorden-Tolk:
Fiction is an un-Germanic word, meaning embellishment,
fabrication, invention: by it we understand in legal sense an
assumption of the law, which gives to a person or to a thing a
certain quality which it does not possess by nature, with the
object of founding thereon a consequence of a certain kind,
which would have been contrary to reason and truth without
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
Id.
OwuvER, supra note 4, at 81.
Id. at 91.
Id.
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the assumption. 8
A new school of thought emerged at the beginning of the
twentieth century, founded by Hans Vaihinger. 19 Vaihinger and his
followers viewed the fiction as a useful tool in the human thought
process. 20 When the mind meets a problem that cannot be solved
by the direct, logical rules of thought, it employs "artifices" in order
to reach the solution through an alternative and, often paradoxical,
path. In this manner, the mind is able to sidestep the obstacle. A
fiction is such an artifice of thought, equating reality with
something admittedly untrue, but assuming it to be true for the
21
purpose of facilitating the thought process.
Vaihinger warned, however, that fictions, while useful in
ascertaining the truth, can cause injustice by presuming to be true
that which plainly is not. 22 Accordingly, once a legal fiction ceases
to be useful, it should be eliminated.2
B.

Advantages and Disadvantages to Legal Fictions

There are many advantages to the use of legal fictions. As
discussed above, Olivier and others have observed that legal
fictions facilitate thought, aid in the evolution of law, and serve as
terminological devices.24 When the thought process encounters an
unfamiliar obstacle that it cannot overcome with the tools at its
disposal, a fiction allows the mind to analogize to a more familiar
situation by treating the former as if it were the latter for the
purpose of intellectual development. 25 At the same time, when
recognized for what it is, the fiction reminds us that the analogy is
26
only an analogy, and should not be taken as truth.
Lon Fuller identified two motives for creating fictions: the
expository motive, in which a fiction is used to convey thoughts or
simplify expression, and the emotional motive, in which a fiction is
used to persuade others that the legal result is the correct one. 27 In
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
women
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
Id. at 38.
OuImR, supra note 4, at 38-39.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 42. Olivier offers as an example of an excessive legal fiction a nle that all
are to be treated as minors. Id.
Cf. Id. at 40, 42.
Id. at 91.
OLRER, supra note 4, at 91.
Id.
Id. at 143-45 (citing FuLLE, supra note 8, at 51-52).
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short, Fuller sees the dominant motive behind the creation of legal
fictions to be "reconcil[iation of] a specific legal result with some
28
premise or postulate."
Nevertheless, several objections have been raised by modem
theorists to the use of fictions in the law.29 The first, and strongest
of these objections, is that fictions promote scientific untruthfulness, i.e. the fiction is employed because it is desirable to
use one rule when another should be applied.A° As in The Palmyra,
the Court decreed a ship to be a person based on the notion that
31
people may forfeit their possessions to the court if they do wrong.
If a ship is a person, the ship may do wrong and may be punished
for it by forfeiture. Thus it appears that the Court applied a rule
which ordinarily would not apply. The fiction allowed the Court to
pretend that reality (i.e. the facts of the case) had changed.3 2 This
deception can lead to difficulties in properly understanding and
applying the legal rule in the future.m
Fictions have also been criticized for creating uncertainty in the
law because they are often formulated broadly rather than
narrowly, thereby leading to problems of interpretation. 34 Moreover,
fictions can undermine respect for the law because they may be
viewed as abandoning truth for the sake of convenience.35 Applying
fictions beyond their intended scope and justification can also lead
to unforeseen and undesirable consequences.36
Vaihinger observed that a fiction, the knowing assumption of an
untrue fact, can easily degenerate into dogma, the unquestioning
acceptance of an idea as established opinion.37 The wide
acceptance of fictions as truth can lead to far-flung and even
disastrous results38
In short, the civilian method of revealing the fiction in the
grammatical structure of the statement has been more or less
28. Id. at 143 (quoting FULLER, supra note 8, at 51-52).
29. Id. at 88-91.
30. OLIVIER, supra note 4, at 88. I also see a "faith-based," historical underpinning to
legal fictions. For example, the need to clarify and apply legal rules in awkward situations
may require an intellectual leap of faith that puts logic, the law, and even reality on hold. In
other words, the ends justify the means to achieve a short-term fix
31. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
32. OLIVIER, supra note 4, at 88.
33. Id. (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 89.
35. Id. at 90.
36. Id. at 90-91.
37. OLVmER, supra note 4, at 43.
38. Id. at 164.
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permanently discarded. Left are the rogue fictions of the legal
world, which have been easily passed on to us by the similar
English common law procedures, and allowed to blossom to full
flower in the American drug war.
C.

Types of Fictions:
Legislative, Judicial and Historical Fictions

Simply stating the advantages and disadvantages identified by
modem theorists does little to illustrate the utility and detriment of
legal fictions as they operate in our legal system today. An analysis
of the different types of fictions employed - legislative, judicial,
and historical - provides a more informative picture.
Legislative fictions are those "employed, ordered, or permitted by
a legislator in statutory enactments." 9 This is done in order to
extend the scope of a legal rule or statute to facts or situations not
previously applicable. 4° For example, if it were desirable to ascribe
to an unborn fetus the rights of an already-born child in a
particular circumstance, the legislature could pass a law stating
that the fetus shall, in that circumstance, be treated as if it were
born. 41 Notice that this does not directly change the legal rule; it
does not say that the statute should apply to the fetus. Instead, the
legislature dictates that we are to make the false assumption that
the fetus has in fact been born. In reality, however, the rule
operates as if it applies to both the fetus and the child.
Legislative fictions can serve the purpose of advancing legal
theory and development and bringing laws into line with
contemporary beliefs and values. They should, however, be used
cautiously and sparingly. Fictions can be used to address a problem
and achieve an equitable solution on an ad hoc basis, but they can
mask the fact that an underlying problem has not been solved. 42 As
Olivier warned,
[a]s *soon as a fiction has attained its full or logical
development - when it cannot be extended to provide a
solution to new problems or a basis for new principles - its
retention in law is harmful, and doubly so when it is retained
or even worse, adopted by a legislature.4
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 97.
OLmWR, supra note 4, at 107.
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On a different note, judicial fictions, created or adopted by
judges when interpreting the law, are so prevalent in the legal
system that they are often hardly recognizable as fictions." Many of
today's legal rules are based on ancient rules developed by using
legal fictions; although the rules are adopted, the fictions are
forgotten. 45 Using a fiction allows a judge, who lacks any legislative
power, to change or adapt the law to achieve equity while
46
maintaining the existing legal rules, principles, and systems.
Lastly, historical fictions are typically adopted into the case law
if they are equitable and have been part of the common law
tradition. 47 The common law rule is either expressed in the form of
a fiction, such as the fetus shall be treated as if it has been born,
or else is based on a fiction, such as implied terms in a contract,
using the fiction that the terms implied represent what the parties
48
actually intended.
D.

The Modern Relevance of the Civilian Definition of Legal
Fictions

Olivier derived from the civilians a definition of a legal fiction
based upon these elements: assumptio; contra veritatem; in re
certa; pro veritate; a jure facta; in re possibili; ex aequitate. In
other words, a fiction is "[an assumption of fact deliberately,
lawfully and irrebutably made contrary to the facts proven or
probable in a particular case, with the object of bringing a
43. Id. at 108.
44. Id. at 115. Clearly fictions are not "reality," but certain more restricted fictions may
one day mirror reality by a linguistic process of gradual change in the meaning of the words,
according to current definition, and specific time of application. While this can work useful
change when applied to traditional common law areas, such as torts or contract, it can also
work tremendous damage when applied to our bedrock law, such as the Constitution. As is
already implied, there is no deception involved here. Take for example the doctrine of the
so-called "attractive nuisance" in torts. A child is supposedly "attracted" to something the
youngster would normally be inquisitive about, and which is potentially hazardous, such as
an open well, or an abandoned mine or a swimming pool on the property. Everyone realizes
the property owner has not "invited" the child to visit the premises, as the legal fiction
suggests. Notwithstanding, the term "inviting" may gradually expand in meaning and
definition to include "attracting". See FULLER, supra note 8, at 12. Because this expansion or
change in meaning has not occurred to date, however, we are still confronted with a "legal
fiction." But once the linguistic change is fully developed, there is in effect no longer a
fiction. Such a linguistic "death" may end some fictions, while other methods, such as
rejection by the courts or acts of the legislature, may end others.
45. OLIVIER, supra note 4, at 115.
46. Id. at 130.
47. Id. at 133.
48. Id. at 134.
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particular legal rule into operation or explaining a legal rule, the
assumption being permitted by law or employed in legal science." 49
The civilian concept of the legal fiction, as refined, remains today
the most accurate, useful and potentially positive characterization.
On this fundamental point, I am confident.5°
The assumptio element derives linguistically from assumere and
51
sumere, meaning to take, or rather, to understand or accept. It
implies a level of untruthfulness, or the possibility of falsity in
assuming for arguments sake, or hypothetically.5 2 It does not ask us
to make an assumption for the sake of applying a legal rule.5
The contra veritatem element means that the assumption is
made contrary to the facts.5 While a fiction could merely
contradict the law applicable at that time to a particular set of
facts, of far more concern is when a fiction grossly distorts
bedrock law. Some laws, like the United States Constitution, are
more "real" than other laws, such as the fictitious law of implied
conditions in contracts, and thus should be less susceptible to
distortion by legal fictions.
The pro veritate element "indicates the finality of the false
assumption."6 The false assumption is irrebutable and may not be
challenged; we are ordered to take it as the truth conclusively.5
The in re certa element, in turn, explains that the false
assumption was made consciously and deliberately, with full
knowledge by all parties involved that we are assuming the untrue
to be true.57 The fiction is not a presumption that may or may not
5
be true, and it is not an attempt at fraud or deceit. 8
The a jure facta element states that the false assumption and the
59
resulting legal consequences are "permitted and applied by law."
No fraud or misrepresentation is involved when a legal fiction is
employed as an instrument of the law; it is done openly and
49. Id. at 81.
50. "Nothing will take the
- not even a burning desire to
supra note 8, at 137.
51. OLIVI, supra note 4,
52. Id. at 59-60.
53. Id. at 61.
54. Id. at 62.
55. Id. at 69.
56. OMUVIR, supra note 4,
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 73.

place, in a student of the law, of a sense of tact and balance
'get the facts' or to know the 'societal background.'" FULLER,
at 59.

at 69.
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according to legal prescription. 60
The in re possibili element is understood to mean that the
assumption must be possible, or that it must be possible to apply
the legal results of the fiction to the case at hand. 61 This
understanding "qualifies the law and not the legal fiction [and]
62
communicates nothing about the structure of the fiction."
Finally, the ex aequitate element expresses the equitable motive
behind fiction in Roman law.6 There are, however, other purposes
and motives behind the use of legal fictions, such as "(i) to bring a
particular legal rule into operation and (ii) to explain a particular
legal rule."61
By critically applying these elements to modem legal fictions, the
reach of the doctrine of legal fictions can be "reigned in." We can
begin to make the use of fictions civilized and thereby perhaps
protect against the worst abuses by making fictions more
transparent. Ultimately, we must be vigilant to discover and discard
those fictions that have outlived their usefulness before they are
able to work. great injustice.
II.

THE FICTION OF ASSET FORFEITURE

Facilitated by state legislatures, Congress, and the judiciary, law
enforcement agencies have evaded the constitutional rights of
property owners in forfeiture cases in recent years.6 "The law
allows government to seize and confiscate the property of people
suspected of some crime, though they may never be tried or, if
tried, may be acquitted."66 There is a financial incentive for law
enforcement officials to seize property because seized assets can
be used to finance law enforcement operations. 67 The procedure by
which property is seized, however, is devoid of most of the
constitutional safeguards accorded to a criminal defendant.68 In
60. Id. at 74.
61. OLIVIER, supra note 4, at 77.
62. Id. at 78.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 79.
65. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 3, at 1; Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the
Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAM L REV. 911,
922-24 (1991).
66. LEVY, supra note 3, at 1. Roscoe Pound said that "fictions easily become starting
points for legal reasoning . . . and are used as the basis for constructing and developing
anomalous and unfortunate propositions." OLIER, supra note 4, at 166 (citation omitted).
67. LEVY, sutpra note 3, at 1.
68. Id. at 7.
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fact, civil in rem forfeitures are a dramatic example of a modem
dogmatic fiction, accepted as truth and no longer questioned, even
in the face of constitutional protections to the contrary. A survey of
the development and modem uses of civil and criminal forfeiture is
helpful in understanding the nature of this fiction.
A.

The Origins of Civil Forfeiture:
Deodands, Animal Sacrifice and Admiralty

In the law of forfeiture several historical streams converge; the
deodands are one such stream. In J. W. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v.
United States, in 1921, the United States Supreme Court justified
the personification fiction by observing:
the law ascribes to the property a certain personality, a power
of complicity and guilt in the wrong. In such case there is
some analogy to the law of deodand by which a personal
chattel that was the immediate cause of the death of any
reasonable creature was forfeited.6
The Court's justification in creating the in rem legal fiction is
really very weak, however, as the original concept of the deodand
was an expiation of guilt by trying and discarding the "guilty
object," not selling it with profits to go to the seizing authorities.
Deodand, from the Latin phrase deo dandum, meaning "given to
God," refers to "a thing forfeited, presumably to God for the good
of the community, but in reality to the English crown."70 Modem
courts sometimes find a textual basis for deodands in the Bible:
"[11f an ox gore a man or a woman that they die, the ox shall be
surely stoned and its flesh shall not be eaten."71 In fact, the Bible
provides little support for the deodand: the ox was stoned to death
by the community because it was guilty of the murder of a human
being.72 The ox was not forfeited and no one benefited from its
death because its flesh was not eaten. 73 Moreover, although the
Hebrews destroyed living objects that did harm, they did not treat
inanimate objects as though they were capable of guilt. 74
On the other hand, "[iun the case of a deodand some official
69.
70.
71.
183, 185
72.
73.
74.

J.W Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510; see also LEVY, supra note 3, at 8.
J.W Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510.
See, e.g., United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Coupe de Ville Two Door, 250 F. Supp.
(W.D. Mo. 1966); see also LEVY, supra note 3, at 7 (citing Exodus 21:28).
LEVY, supra note 3, at 9.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
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must be the beneficiary of the value of the agent causing the
death."7 5 The Hebrew tradition therefore does not provide an
adequate historical basis for the deodand, or later, in rem
forfeiture.
The ancient Athenian practice of animal trials, instead of just
stoning the beast, and sacrifice provides a slightly better, but still
inadequate, precedent for deodands. In actual trials of animals that
killed people, Athenian judges endowed the animal with a
personality and then condemned it to death.7 6 At least one
commentator, however, has questioned whether an ancient
Athenian practice actually served as the foundation for the
7v
medieval tradition of the deodand.
Despite the murky source of the European tradition,
"[rletribution against inanimate objects, such as the sword of John
at Stile or against irrational beasts, became common in the Middle
Ages."78 European Christians believed that these objects were
demonically possessed and if not executed or destroyed, the
community would be the victim of the divine wrath and fury of
God. 79 In the face of such compelling circumstances, little
consideration was given to the owners of these objects. 8° "The legal
foundation was being built to regard the innocence of the owner of
81
the property as an irrelevant consideration."
Both the ecclesiastical courts of the medieval church and secular
authorities tried and executed animals as if they were rational
beings, sometimes dressing them up in people's clothing before
carrying out the death sentence.8 2 The guilty animal or object was
either given to the family of the deceased to destroy or destroyed
in a judicial proceeding, as a "symbolic ransom to appease the
injured parties as well as God."83
Over time, this practice transformed into a means of atonement
for the "sins" of the guilty object or beast by providing
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 9-10.
LEvy, supra note 3, at 10.
Id.
Id.

80.

Id.

81. Id.
82. LEVY, supra note 3, at 11. Indeed, these practices continued well into the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, with the last known execution occurring in Switzerland in
1906. Id. at n.20.
83. Id. at 11.

2001

Legal Fiction and Forfeiture

compensation to a chieftain or king.84 As the individual responsible
for keeping the peace, the king or chieftain should be the one to
5
benefit when a homicide, however accidental, broke that peace.8
By the thirteenth century, the English Parliament had even enacted
a statute that specified the deodand procedure.8 6 The value of the
deodand was determined by a coroner's jury, and that amount,
rather than the object itself, was forfeitable to the king.87 The
surviving kinsmen could no longer retrieve the object or animal
because the king was responsible for maintaining the courts of
justice and the public peace. 88
The deodand was thus transformed from a religious expiation of
guilt to a useful revenue-generating device for the English crown,
guaranteeing the perpetuation of the tradition for many centuries.89
This medieval European practice is the true root of the current
fiction of in rem forfeiture. Divorced from reality and concepts of
right and wrong - or guilt and innocence - it is a grossly harsh,
unjust, and inequitable procedure in relation to the civilian
conception of the legal fiction ° Unlike Roman legal fictions, which
were applied sparingly and only to achieve an equitable result, the
English statutory and common law of the deodand evolved over
time to apply the presumptions of forfeiture to the Crown in all
circumstances, masking the fiction as a dogmatic rule.91
In the eighteenth century, William Blackstone offered negligence
as a justification for the fiction of the deodand. 92 He argued that
accidental death caused by property was partly the result of
negligence of the property owner, and therefore punishment in the
form of forfeiture would induce the owner to take better care.93
The problem with this argument is twofold: first, it ignores the fact
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 12. At this juncture, the deodand became a permanent legislative fiction, at
least until the law was changed or revoked.
87. LEV, supra note 3, at 12.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 10.
91. Fuller offers as an example the Roman legal fiction that a foreigner would be
considered "as if" he were a citizen of Rome, though a judge remained aware that such was
not the case. FuLLFR, supra note 8, at 36 (citation omitted). The English presumptions in the
law of deodand, however, stood as incontrovertible fact. See supra notes 86-90 and
accompanying text.
92. LEVY, supra note 3, at 15 (citing 1 WLLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAaRIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 301-02).

93.

Id.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:77

that liability for one's own negligence was already a developing
common law doctrine; second, the owner of the property may have
been the victim of the accident, in which case the incentive to take
94
care already existed.
By the early nineteenth century in England, a judicially-fashioned
doctrine under the law of deodand dictated that that the Crown,
and not the relatives of an accident victim, would recover from the
owner of the property causing the accident.95 Such an absurd rule
could not stand for long. As increased population size and
industrialization in England led to more frequent accidents in the
eighteenth century, popular pressure finally forced Parliament to
consider an alternative to deodands. 96 Lord Campbell's Act, enacted
in 1846, abolished deodands and vested a right of action in the
97
victims' survivors.
Although deodands were abolished in England, their underlying
principles formed the foundations of civil forfeiture in the United
States, and the fiction of the guilty object persists.98 The
rationalization that deodands and the forfeiture of property were
not punitive measures, because no person was found to be guilty,
also continues to this day.9 Nowhere is this more apparent than in
the admiralty law of the United States.
Admiralty, perhaps as much as or even more than deodands,
shaped the development of the American law of forfeiture. 100 Like
the deodand, which provided the foundation for the fiction that the
"thing can be guilty," Colonial admiralty courts often proceeded in
ren against a vessel rather than in personam against the vessel's
owner.101 A suspicious vessel could be arrested and prosecuted by
name by the government, and the law treated the ship as if it were
a guilty person.102
94. Id. at 15-16.
95. Id. at 17-18.
96. Id. at 18.
97. LEVY, supra note 3, at 19 (citation omitted).
98. Id. But see James Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law - Banished at
Last?, 62 CORNELL L REV. 768, 771-72 (1977) (arguing that the deodand-forfeiture connection
may not be as strong as some scholars believe).
99. LEVY, supra note 3, at 20.
100. Id. at 39.
101. Id. (citing OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 26 (1881)).
102. LEvy, supra note 3, at 43. At the time, other modes of transportation were not
treated as though they were human, and were not prosecuted in rem. Perhaps this
difference existed because ships were often viewed as living things - "the most living of
inanimate things," as Oliver Wendell Homes once observed. Id. (citation omitted). Another
possibility is that ships carried the most valuable cargo, and were themselves also of high
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In many cases, as with customs violations, the owner of a vessel
was unknown, unavailable, or out of the court's jurisdiction. In
those circumstances, the court proceeded in a civil action against
the vessel itself.1°3 In the event that an owner contested the
forfeiture, the owner had the affirmative burden of proof to
demonstrate the innocence of the vessel. 1°4 Even an illegal act by
an ordinary crewmember could cause the forfeiture of a vessel,
regardless of whether or not the vessel's captain or owner was
aware of the crewmember's conduct. 10 5 If the vessel's innocence
could not be proven, then the vessel and its cargo were sold at
public auction, with the judge of the court, any informer, the
colonial governor, and the Crown all receiving revenues from the
sale. 106
Despite the oppressive and unfair nature of colonial admiralty
proceedings, after the Revolution the Founders perpetuated the
personification fiction in admiralty. The Constitution extended the
judicial power of the United States to "all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction" and the First Congress enacted laws giving
the new federal government the power to seize vessels. 107 In this
manner, substantial admiralty jurisdiction and in rem forfeitures in
civil actions were written indelibly into American law.
In the 1827 case of The Palmyra, counsel for a Spanish privateer
argued that forfeiture of the ship was illegal without conviction of
the offender0 8 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding
that in admiralty an in rem proceeding could progress independent
of any criminal in personam proceeding. 1°9 The ship, and not the
owner, was the offender and "the offense is attached primarily to
the thing."" 0 Though there was no criminal conviction, the ship
monetary value, making the invention of a fiction allowing the seizure of ships and cargo
more lucrative. Id. at 43. In The Common Law, Holmes noted that "it is only by supposing
the ship to have been treated as if endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming
peculiarities of the maritime law can be made intelligible." Id. (citing HOLMES, supra note
101, at 27, 29-30).
103. LEvY, supra note 3, at 43.
104. Id. at 43-44.
105. Id. at 44.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 46 (citations omitted). The Constitution thus facilitates the in rem legal
fiction by establishing admiralty jurisdiction, while federal law continues in rem legal fiction
by allowing the forfeiture of property, mimicking the presumption of the English forfeiture
concept rather than the conscious use of fiction inherent in the Roman and civilian method.
108. LEVY, supra note 3, at 50 (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14-15).
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110. Id. (citation omitted).
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could be seized. The Palmyra remains good law to this day, and
has been used by the Court to justify modem civil forfeiture
laws."'1
B.

Origins of CriminalForfeiture

It is to our advantage to examine the roots of criminal forfeiture.
Unlike civil forfeiture, in which the guilt or innocence of the
property owner is of no concern, the guilt or innocence of a
defendant is central in criminal forfeiture.1 1 2 A criminal defendant
forfeits nothing unless convicted of the crime. 1 3 Thus, the
proceeding in criminal forfeiture is in personam, or against a
person being charged with a crime, while the proceeding in civil
forfeiture is in rem, or against the object involved.114 The
difference between civil and criminal forfeiture reflects the
variance between civil and criminal law: civil law deals with private
rights and remedies and is intended to be regulatory, not punitive;
criminal law, on the other hand, punishes a criminal on behalf of
society for committing a crime."15
The origin of criminal forfeiture lies in medieval escheats and
reversions of an estate to a feudal lord." 6 Originally, a tenant's
failure to fulfill his obligation to his lord was called a "felony." Over
time, however, the term felony took on a broader meaning,
referring to any significant breach of the feudal bond, such as the
commission of serious crimes like rape, murder, or robbery, and
punishable by death.1 7 When a felon was executed, the felon's
lands escheated to his lord." 8 The king, being the greatest of the
feudal lords, benefited the most from this arrangement. 19 So
lucrative were the revenues from escheat that "Henry II (1154-89)
. . . introduced reforms intended to extend his jurisdiction . . .
supplant[ing] the manorial courts of local lords, making royal
justice the rule rather than the exception." 20
Although financial benefit always seems to be the underlying
111. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. ("Pearson Yacht', 416 U.S.
663, 683-84 (1974) (citing The Palmyra as precedent for a modem asset forfeiture law).
112. LEVY, supra note 3, at 22.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
117. LEvY, supra note 3, at 24.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 26.
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motivation for forfeitures, modem criminal forfeiture in the United
States utilizes few of the excessive legal fictions found in the civil
arena. This began as a result of colonial hostility to Crown
revenue-generating devices. After the Revolution, the Founders
limited forfeiture in cases of treason to the offending individual,
121
forbidding the punishment of relatives by "Corruption of Blood."
Moreover, the First Congress in 1790 abolished criminal forfeiture
for felony, as well as for treason. 122 This eliminated some of the
strongest financial motives for criminal forfeiture in the early
United States, and discouraged the use of extreme dogmatic
fictions in criminal forfeiture.
These early renunciations of the legal fiction added to the greater
equity of the American criminal forfeiture experience. 123 However,
confronted by the scourge of organized crime in the late 1960s,
Congress attempted to get tough with the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 ("RICO"), which provided for the
criminal forfeiture of properties involved in the commission of a
124
crime or acquired from it.
RICO and similar laws, however, proved ineffective in the fight
against organized crime, largely because the criminal forfeiture
provisions as enacted in those laws did not provide for the
"relation back" of title of proceeds of crime, and because the assets
could not be seized pending trial. 25 In other words, because these
two legal fictions were omitted from the new laws, the laws
initially did not work very well. The introduction of the relation
back legal fiction in 1984, and the addition of "substitute asset
forfeiture" - another legal fiction that allowed the government to
seize assets in place of forfeitable assets that could not be traced
ameliorated these issues, while further diminishing a defendant's
126
constitutional rights.
121. Id. at 37-38 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2).
122. LEVY, supra note 3, at 38 (citation omitted).
123. This makes criminal forfeiture inherently more "reality" based and less fictional
than civil forfeiture, across a wide array of issues.
Limited criminal forfeitures continued to exist in some states and on the federal level. "In
practice, however, criminal forfeitures nearly disappeared from the United States until 1970."
LEVY, supra note 3, at 38.
124. LEVY, supra note 3, at 63, 77 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 79-81, 82. The "relation back" doctrine is a fiction that presumes that
forfeiture occurs at the time of the commission of a crime, regardless of any subsequent
sales or encumbrances. Id. at 31. This means that any subsequent transactions, such as sale
of the property or payment made to an attorney, are void and both the owner and the third
party must forfeit their interests.
126. Id. at 109-10 (citations omitted). In the criminal forfeiture arena, there is an
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C. The Modern Use of Civil Forfeiture:
Evading ConstitutionalProtections Through Fiction
Civil forfeiture can be attractive to lawmakers because it is quick
and easy. Because civil forfeiture does not require a criminal
proceeding in which the defendant has the benefit of constitutional
protections, it is much more likely to succeed than criminal
forfeiture. 12 7 For example, in a criminal trial guilt must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt before forfeiture is allowed. In civil
forfeiture, however, the proceeding takes place in rem against the
property to be forfeited. Thus, the government need only show
probable cause, the reasonable belief that a connection exists
between the property and a crime or that circumstances warranted
suspicion, or what one commentator has characterized as "anything
more than a hunch."' 28 This is of course an intensely fictional
approach that goes far beyond the limited Roman and civilian use
29
of fictions "to do equity."'
In civil forfeiture, once probable cause is established, the burden
of proof shifts to the property owner to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the property is not related to the crime. The
significance of this burden shift to the rights of property owners
cannot be overstated. It places innocent property owners, even
those who have been acquitted of criminal charges, and third
parties in the position of having to prove a negative.'tm The owner
must demonstrate, not that he was innocent or lacked knowledge,
but that the property was not involved or connected in any way to
the commission of a crime, i.e. that the object itself is innocent. It
matters not whether the owner of the property was involved in the
crime, or even aware that criminal activity was taking place. The
owner does not even have to be accused or even suspected of
involvement in the criminal activity for his property to be forfeited.
If the owner cannot prove the object's innocence, the government
has a right to the property that relates back to the time of its
unavoidable tension between the crime control and due process in the criminal justice
system. However, legal fictions, sparingly employed, may sometimes yield positive, limited,
short-term benefits. It is generally best to "drop-out" the fiction as soon as possible, and for
the court to force itself to formulate a more realistic, more long-term rule of law.
127. Id. at 47.
128. Id. at 48.
129. See supra notes 10-33 and accompanying text.
130. In fact, over three-fourths of those victimized by forfeiture are never charged with
a crime. See LEvy, supra note 3, at 48.
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illegal use.1 31
This is where the personification fiction comes in. The property
itself is ascribed the qualities of a person and can, therefore, be
found guilty in a court of law. Common sense suggests that an
inanimate object is not capable of culpability. The legal fiction,
however, allows the court to ignore common sense and prosecute
the object as if it were a person. By employing this fiction the
courts have been able to side-step the question of whether civil
forfeiture imposes a punishment on the owner of the property
seized, because the proceeding takes place against the property
itself. Thus technically, the outcome is not a punitive measure
against the owner. Again, common sense tells us that seizure of a
person's property is punitive, regardless of the purpose of the
seizure. If a person's property is found to be guilty because,
unbeknownst to the owner, the lessee has committed a crime, it is
the owner, and not the property, who suffers the consequences.
The in ren legal fiction goes so far beyond reality that arguably
it does not qualify as a "legal fiction." Instead, perhaps the in rem
personification is simply an outright "fiction," being so far removed
from reality that the civilian definition of the contra veritatem
element - that is, the facts of the case at hand are contrary to
only the facts as stated, not reality - is stretched beyond all
reasonable limits. 32 For our purposes, therefore, we classify in rem
legal fiction as a "dogmatic legal fiction".' 13
Both civil and criminal forfeiture raise questions of constitutional
m '
Many challenges have been brought questioning the
concern.
131. LEVY, supra note 3, at 48.
132. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text. Vaihinger spent considerable time
and effort noting that because a fiction is contra veritatem, it must be narrowly employed
and not be "extended beyond all reasonable limits." See OLviER, supra note 4, at 62 (citation
omitted). To better explore the concepts and useful definitions, we will treat in ren
forfeiture as a dogmatic legal fiction, although even this is likely generous.
133. Cf. OLvIEi, supra note 4, at 162-67. Dogmatic legal fictions take something that
seems inadequate on the facts and try to expand it in the context of a previously accepted
rule. Dogmatic fictions exhibit the characteristic of being easily extended, thereby allowing
highly undesirable secondary rules to flow from the original fiction. In civil forfeiture, for
example, an indigent driver who is stopped on a pretext will not be entitled to a
government-provided attorney, even if certain property is seized during the stop, unless the
driver is also charged with a crime.
134. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 3, at 2-3 (citation omitted). Issues include First
Amendment freedom of the press challenges regarding obscene materials; Fourth
Amendment search and seizure; Fifth Amendment due process, self-incrimination, and double
jeopardy; Sixth Amendment right to counsel, speedy trial, confrontation of witnesses, and
compulsory process; Seventh Amendment right to civil trial in civil cases of $20 or more; and
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines. Id at 177.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:77

constitutionality of forfeiture laws and proceedings. 135 In particular,
the First Amendment and the problem of defining what constitutes
36
obscenity have made prosecutions under RICO controversial.
Congress amended RICO in 1984 to include the obscenity business
after finding evidence that organized crime was profiting from that
industry. 37 In United States v. Pryba, in 1987, a federal district
court held that the post-conviction seizure of materials under the
amended RICO provisions did not unconstitutionally chill speech
"where there is proper proof that they were acquired or maintained
with the ill-gotten gains from racketeering activity, including
dealing in obscenity."' 38 That decision could allow for the
confiscation and destruction of constitutionally protected material
simply because it sat on a shelf in the same bookstore as the
obscene material. 139 In the 1993 case of Alexander v. United States,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the destruction
of both obscene and legally protected materials under the RICO
forfeiture provisions.4' Thus, the judicial fiction places the First
Amendment protections in a questionable light.
In 1886, in Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
because civil in rem forfeiture had a punitive as well as remedial
purpose, the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment and the
Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination extended to
these "quasi-criminal" seizures.'4 ' Professor Levy argues, however,
that law enforcement officials pursue forfeiture to finance their
operations and as an alternative to prosecution. If convictions are
not the object of the police, they will not be deterred by the
exclusionary rule.' 42 Although illegally seized evidence cannot be
used to meet the probable cause standard for forfeiture, law
enforcement officials can establish cause with other, untainted
circumstantial evidence.'4
A forfeiture exception has also developed to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment: if an officer believes that
he has probable cause, he may seize property without a warrant.""
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

LEvy, supm note 3, at 177 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 178.
674 FSupp. 1504, 1518 (E.D. Va. 1987).
LEVY, supra note 3, at 180-81.
Id. at 180 (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993)).
Id. at 183 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886)).
Id. at 184.
Id. at 184-85.
LEVY, supra note 3, at 185 (citations omitted).
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This exception is supported by the fiction that the object, rather
than the person, is being tried, which tends to de-emphasize the
owner's rights. Once the property is associated with crime, whether
as a means to it, a product of it, or an acquisition from it, title to
the object reverts to the government under the relation-back
doctrine; therefore, an officer may seize it regardless of whether
there are proceedings against the guilty owner or claimant. "In
effect the association with crime taints the45property so that it no
longer warrants the protection of the law."
Congress has often used civil in rem forfeiture to avoid these
concerns. For example, during the Civil War, Congress passed the
Confiscation Act of 1862, which authorized the use of in rem civil
forfeiture proceedings to punish rebels who possessed property in
the North.146 That act allowed an in rem forfeiture of rebel
property even though the property may have had no connection to
the alleged crime of treason, and without a criminal trial against
the offender.'47
In Miller v. United States, in 1871, the Supreme Court upheld the
act on the grounds that it was an exercise of war power and not a
criminal measure intended for the punishment of crime.' 4s In a
powerful dissent, Justice Field concluded that:
[i]t seems to me that the reasoning which upholds the
proceedings in this case, works a complete revolution in our
criminal jurisprudence, and establishes the doctrine that
proceedings for the punishment of crime against the person of
for such
the offender may be disregarded, and proceedings
49
alone.
property
his
against
punishment be taken
Since that time, civil forfeiture in federal law has expanded
dramatically. Today, over 150 federal statutes mandate the
forfeiture of property.15° These "laws" allow forfeiture of "guilty"
firearms, unsafe and uninspected food products, conveyances
containing minute amounts of marijuana, and "guilty" animals used
in fighting. 51 In surveying this modern state of affairs, one
commentator has noted that:
145. Id.
146. Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 56-57.
148. Id. (citing Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 305-06 (1871)).
149. Miller, 78 U.S. at 323 (Field, J., dissenting).
150. LEvY, supra note 3, at 56-57 (citation omitted).
151. Id. (citations omitted).
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[t]he personification fiction rationalized punishment of the
vessel as a means of diverting attention from the practical fact
that in the real world criminal punishment had been
summarily inflicted on the innocent owner without allowing
him the rights enjoyed by a common felon. In rem proceedings
against things, like the deodands to which they were
analogous, were make-believe prosecutions of property in
order to deprive the owners of their constitutional rights,
thereby enabling the government to make a confiscation not
otherwise likely.15 2
Thus, because the owner is not per se on trial, just his property,
there is no criminal case, no need for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, no prohibition against double jeopardy or excessive fines,
and no right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
Furthermore, there is not necessarily a right to indigent defense
counsel.
The dogmatic, historical fiction of in rem forfeiture excludes any
possibility of a meaningful answer to the problem. The use of the
in rem personification fiction clearly subverts the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights, but itself remains unquestioned. The civilian
definition of a legal fiction demands that such a false assumption
have a lawful effect. To the contrary, in rem fiction is applied
broadly and wholly without concern as to the unjust results to the
accused.
In its modern incarnation, the in rem civil forfeiture can have
profoundly unjust consequences. For example, in Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., in 1974, Puerto Rican authorities
confiscated a vessel owned by a yacht leasing company upon
finding one marijuana cigarette onboard. 15 The yacht leasing
company had no knowledge that the lessee of the yacht had used it
illegally; company officials only learned of the forfeiture when they
attempted to repossess the vessel after having received no rent for
it.lM Rejecting the yacht leasing company's argument that the
forfeiture was an unconstitutional taking of property without just
compensation, the Court held that the innocence of the yacht
leasing company was immaterial because the law proceeded against
the guilty thing. 155 Moreover, there was no due process violation
152. Id. at 51.
153. Id. at 82 (citing Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 663).
154. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 668.
155. Id. at 680-88 (reviewing the history of deodand and its relation to modem asset
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because the government had a special need to act promptly.'1'
Although the Pearson Yacht Court established an "innocent
owners" test, that test imposed upon property owners an almost
insurmountable burden, requiring an owner to demonstrate not
only that he was unaware of the illegal use of his property, but that
he had also done all that reasonably could have been expected to
prevent the proscribed use of the property.15 7 Determining in
conclusory fashion that the yacht leasing company had failed to
meet this burden, the Court set no standard for making such a
determination in future cases. 158
D.

The Dangers of Fiction:
Effects of Civil and Criminal Forfeiture

How can the Supreme Court's lack of concern for the property
rights of owners be explained? The 1976 case of New Orleans v.
Dukes illustrates the Court's attitude toward such rights. 15 In that
case, the Court made clear that economic rights are not
fundamental rights protected by the strict scrutiny standard that
other rights enjoy, allowing a city to regulate a street vendor out of
business. 160 Rather, law regulating economic need only pass a
61
rational basis test.'
Pearson Yacht is simply one more example of the Court's lack of
concern for property rights.62 Once again, the highest court in the
land engaged in a legal fiction. The guarantees of the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments could raise Constitutional questions in
every property rights case that comes before the Court.16 The
Court, however, has ruled that these are primarily matters of state
forfeiture laws).
156. Id. at 679-80 (arguing that a boat could be moved beyond jurisdiction if
pre-seizure notification was required).
157. Id. at 689-90.
158. Id. at 690.
159. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
160. LEVY, supra note 3, at 87 (citing City of Orleans, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)).
161. Id.; see generally Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug
War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. Ciu. L REv. 35 (1998) (surveying the myriad of state
forfeiture statutes and the economic reasons for these laws).
162. LEV, supra note 3, at 89.
163. Both Amendments defend "life, liberty, and property" against any taking without
due process of law. LVY, supra note 3 at 88. Levy notes that the Fifth Amendment's just
compensation clause protects property, as do the Fourth and Seventh Amendments. Id. The
Constitution does not grade rights, however, the Court does.
It is difficult to concur with the Court's logic in allowing a state to cause a person to lose
his lawful employment and be unable to feed himself, while retaining his free speech rights.
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concern. This is another non-equitable (meaning contrary to the
ancient Roman, equitable tradition) historical fiction enforced by
our highest judiciary.
The lack of protection provided to forfeiture victims raises many
questions about the appropriate place of forfeiture law in a just
society. Both civil and criminal forfeiture laws were intended to
target Mafiosi and drug kingpins, but this is not the effect these
laws have had.'6
For example, California prosecutors conducted over 6,000
forfeiture cases in 1992, 94% of which involved the seizure of
$5,000 or less. 16 5 These are certainly not significant seizures
underminiig the economic base of organized crime. About 80% of
civil forfeiture cases go uncontested, possibly because the suspects
are in fact guilty, but also perhaps because many people simply
cannot afford the high cost of legal counsel needed to contest a
case.1 66 Perhaps many potential claimants balance the high cost of
attorney fees against the chances of overcoming this burden and
opt to just cut their losses.
In 1992 the president of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys declared that civil forfeiture "is essentially
government thievery."1 67 The problems surrounding forfeitures are
exacerbated by the fact that the forfeiture laws give the police a
financial stake in the confiscated property.'16 The Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984 increased this stake by creating "equitable
sharing" between state and federal law enforcement officials, one
of the many ways in which this legislation "revolutionized"
forfeiture in the United States.' 69 Through a process by which the
federal government "adopts" a state forfeiture case, the United
States brings a forfeiture proceeding under more favorable federal
law and skims a small portion of the proceeds off the top,
returning the rest to the law enforcement agency that made the
seizure, on the condition that the money is spent only on law
enforcement. 170
Congressman John Conyers of the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Government Operations commented that the
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

LEvY, supra note 3, at 127.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 132 (citation omitted).
Id. at 137.
LEVY, supra note 3, at 145 (citation omitted).
Id. at 149.
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guidance from the federal government on how that money is spent
amounts to little more than:
whether it can pass two tests: (1) The Straight Face Test,
which asks, Can you tell me this with a straight face? And (2)
The Washington Post Test, which asks: If taken out of context
and put on the front page of the Washington Post, will it still
7
look good?' '
Equitable sharing and adoption reward state and local abuses of
forfeiture law by providing a huge incentive to law enforcement
agencies to seize as much property as possible. 72 Allowing a state
law enforcement agency, historically limited by state constitutional
provisions prohibiting civil forfeiture to have the federal
government "adopt" the forfeiture, allows for a legislative fiction
which both violates state's rights and creates a dangerous and
illegal precedent. The financial motivations that have been
paramount since the development of the deodand and escheat in
medieval England are obvious.
One of the civilian elements of the legal fiction is the in re certa
element. This simply means that all parties involved - judge, jury,
litigants and counsel on both sides - must be aware of the
inherent falsehood of the in rem legal fiction. Somewhere along
the way the in rem fiction became a matter of settled opinion and
no longer subject to debate. This is a dangerous situation, as it has
been well recognized that any legal fiction should be dropped from
the case just prior to the court rendering a judgment. The fiction is
ideally only a bridge between existing and future law which should
assist, not conceal, the judicial process.' 73
III.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FORFEITURE LAW

If the expansion in the use of civil in rem forfeiture in the past
three decades has been the occasion of some concern, then recent
developments both in the case law and federal statutory law have
been the cause of some hope for the future. While the Supreme
Court has taken a small step in the right direction, Congress has
enacted substantial legislation to curtail forfeiture in the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000. Other members of Congress have
proposed even more radical plans to eliminate civil forfeiture
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
Id. at 156.
OUVMER, supra note 4, at 71.
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altogether, finally eradicating the legal fiction that we have come to
use without honestly assessing the reasons why.
A.

Two Steps Forward, One Step Back:
Recent Judicial Treatment of Forfeiture and Fiction

In 1972, in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, the
Supreme Court rejected a claim that a civil forfeiture proceeding
against jewels following an unsuccessful criminal prosecution for
smuggling those jewels constituted a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 174 Less than twenty years later, however, in the
1989 case United States v. Halper, the Court acknowledged that a
civil forfeiture proceeding against a medical services manager
already convicted of Medicare fraud was so punitive in nature that
it constituted a second punishment for the same crime. 17 5 In 1993,
in United States v. Austin, the Court also held that a civil
forfeiture is the equivalent of a fine, and thus is limited by the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines.'7 6
Even as the Court reached these positive outcomes, however, in
other areas the fiction of civil forfeiture remained unquestioned.
For example, in 1989, in Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, the
Court upheld the seizure of funds earmarked to pay a defense
lawyer under the fictional relation-back theory. 17 7 The Court stated
that "[a] defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another
person's money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those
funds are the only way that that defendant will be able to retain
the attorney of his choice."' 78 Recall also Pearson Yacht, a 1974
case in which civil in rem seizure was upheld without due process
for fear that the yacht might be moved out of the court's
jurisdiction.' 79
In 1993, in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,
the Court held that "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the Government in a civil forfeiture case
from seizing real property without first affording the owner notice
and an opportunity to be heard."8 ° In that case, the federal
174. LEVY, supra note 3, at 187 (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,
409 U.S. 232 (1972)).
175. Id. at 188 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)).
176. Id. (citing United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)).
177. Id. at 198 (citing Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)).
178. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626.
179. LEVY, supra note 3, at 191 (citation omitted).
180. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property ("James Daniel'), 510 U.S. 43,
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government seized a home in which drugs and drug paraphernalia
had been found over four years after the homeowner had pled
18
guilty to a criminal offense under state law. '
While the Court did not overturn the underlying federal statute
authorizing the seizure, Justice Clarence Thomas in a separate
opinion expressed concern that the statute allowing seizure of real
property was "so broad that it differs not only in degree, but in
kind, from its historical antecedents."18 2 He questioned whether the
legal fiction "that the thing is primarily considered the offender,"
supported the in rem proceedings.'83 He added: "Given that current
practice under [the law] appears to be far removed from the legal
fiction upon which the civil forfeiture doctrine is based, it may be
necessary - in an appropriate case - to reevaluate our generally
deferential approach to legislative judgments in this area of civil
forfeiture." 1 4 Justice Thomas courageously questioned the
then-current state of civil forfeiture jurisprudence while at the same
time challenging legislative authority.
Many of these decisions are giant steps in the right direction
regarding the use of the personification fiction to justify the denial
of constitutional rights. The more recent decisions have tended to
uphold constitutional rights. 185 The Court, however, has a long way
to go before it adequately remedies the scores of decisions over the
years which have failed to sustain those rights. The real culprit,
however, is Congress, to whose judgment the Court frequently
defers.'86 But Congress has recently made strides in the right
direction, as the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 plainly
demonstrates.
B. CongressionalSolutions to Forfeiture Problems
Reform of civil forfeiture laws has garnered wide-spread support
and created strange bedfellows. The National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers; David B. Smith, a founder of the
Department of Justice civil forfeiture program; the American Civil
46 (1993).
181. James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 46.
182. LEVY, supra note 3, at 191 (citing James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 82 (Thomas, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part)).
183. LEVY, supra note 3, at 191 (citation omitted).
184. James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 82 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
185. An exception is the decision approving the forfeiture and destruction of
non-obscene books. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
186. LEVy, supra note 3, at 205.
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Liberties Union; financial and commercial institutions; and
Republican congressman Henry Hyde, among others, are some of
the leading advocates of legislative reform. 8 7 The Orlando Sentinel,
The Pittsburgh Press, and the ChristianScience Monitor have all
published influential articles criticizing civil forfeiture, as have
other newspapers from across the nation. 188
In 1993, Congressman Henry Hyde introduced the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act.189 His proposed legislation provided for
significant reforms in forfeiture proceedings, including placing the
burden of proof on the government and increasing this burden to a
showing of "clear and convincing evidence."1 90 Congressman John
Conyers introduced an even more revolutionary bill, the Asset
Forfeiture Justice Act.' 9' His proposal would have, in effect,
abolished civil forfeiture by eliminating in rem proceedings and
providing that forfeiture could only take place after a criminal
conviction. 92 This would have done away with the personification
fiction once and for all. As Congress deliberated over the proposed
legislation, Attorney General Janet Reno instructed the Department
of Justice to review and recommend changes to civil forfeiture
policies and procedures.193 With the 1994 "Republican Revolution"
in Congress, Congressman Hyde became chair of the House
Judiciary Committee, allowing him to push for his version of
forfeiture reform. 194 Seven years after these reforms were
introduced, President Clinton signed the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000 ("CAFRA") into law.
Although the personification fiction is still clearly evident in the
bill's language, CAFRA is a substantial improvement for due
process and property rights of individuals in forfeiture law in the
following ways: (1) the so-called cost bond is abolished; (2)
indigent defendants, with exceptions, will receive court-appointed
counsel; (3) property can be released to the owner upon evidence
of a hardship; and (4) there is a substantially increased innocent
owner defense with wide application to almost all federal civil
187. Id. at 210.
188. Id. at 209-10.
189. Id. at 210.
190. Id. at 210-11.
191. LEvy, supra note 3, at 213.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 217. The proposals that came out of that review, however, turned out to be
"overwhelmingly a prosecutor's wish list," according to David B. Smith. Id. at 219.
194. Id. at 226.
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5
forfeiture statutes. 19

Under the previous law, claimants wishing to challenge the
forfeiture of their property were required to post a bond. This
would clearly create hardships for indigent owners who may have
few assets aside from the property seized. Given that the vast
majority of forfeitures involve amounts below $5,000, is it any
wonder that most of these are seizures are not contested? 196 The
high cost of posting bond and retaining counsel might have
discouraged owners from bringing a claim, either because they
lacked resources or because the challenge would be more costly
than the value of the property seized. Regardless of the claimant,
whether wealthy or poor, guilty or innocent, the cost bond is an
impediment to justice and the elimination of the bond is a victory
for individual rights. 197
In addition to abolishing the cost bond, CAFRA provides for
court-appointed counsel for some indigent claimants. 198 If a
claimant is represented by court-appointed counsel in a related
criminal proceeding, the court may authorize counsel to represent
the civil forfeiture claim as well.'9 For indigent property owners
that are not defending related criminal charges, CAFRA provides
for representation by an attorney from the Legal Services
Corporation if the property subject to forfeiture is real property
being used by the claimant as a primary residence. 2°° Though this
change still leaves a large number of claimants without legal
counsel, it is a step in the right direction.
In a small but significant victory for property rights, CAFRA
allows the court to release the property to the claimant upon a
showing of hardship. 20 ' The court may order release of the
property, pending the final disposition of the forfeiture proceeding,
if continued possession by the government will cause "substantial
hardship" to the claimant. 202 Congress has recognized that while the
property itself may technically be the one awaiting trial, the seizure
195. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L No. 106-185, 114 Stat.
202 (2000).
196. See LEvy, supra note 3, at 127.
197. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act § 983(a)(2)(E).
198. CAFRA § 983(b)(1)-(2).
199. CAFRA § 983(b)(1)(A). The court is authorized to deny such a request, however,
taking into consideration: "(i) the person's standing to contest the forfeiture; and (ii) whether
the claim appears to be made in good faith." CAFRA §983(b)(1)(B).
200. CAFRA §983(b)(2)(A).
201. CAFRA §983(O(1)(D).
202. Id.
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has a very real and sometimes devastating effect on the owner of
the property.
CA17RA also provides a substantially greater innocent owner
defense, with wide application to almost all federal civil forfeiture
statutes.2°3 A meaningful innocent owner defense is crucial to
restoring justice to civil forfeiture proceedings; however, the
overwhelming majority of statutes contain no such defense. 2°4
CAFRA remedies this by providing that "[a]n innocent owner's
interest in property shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture
statute."20 5 Although the claimant in a civil forfeiture proceeding
still must bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is an "innocent owner," the new law makes this a
somewhat easier task. First, the bill increases the burden the
government must meet before forfeiture is justified, from probable
cause to a preponderance of the evidence. 2°6 CAFRA also defines
an "innocent owner," clearing up the confusion created in Pearson
Yacht by providing a reasonable standard: the owner must take
affirmative steps to stop illegal use of property only upon learning
that such conduct actually exists. 207 The act also suggests the ways
in which a person may meet this standard, including, demonstrating
that the person:
gave timely notice to an appropriate law enforcement agency
of information that led the person to know the conduct giving
rise to a forfeiture would occur or has occurred; and... in a
timely fashion revoked or made a good faith attempt to revoke
permission for those engaging in such conduct to use the
property or took reasonable actions in consultation with a law
enforcement agency to discourage or prevent the illegal use of
208
the property.
The bill does not require a person to take any steps that the person
reasonably believes would put themselves or innocent third parties
203. CAFRA § 983(d).
204. LEVY, supra note 3, at 162.
205. CAFRA § 983(d)(1). However, the innocent owner has the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id.
206. CAFRA § 983(c)(1).
207. CAFRA § 983(d)2)(A)(i)-(ii). CAFRA defines an innocent owner as one who "(i)
did not know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture; or (ii) upon learning of the conduct
giving rise to forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances
to terminate such use of the property." Id.
208. CAFRA § 983(d)(2)(B)(I)-(1).
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in danger.2°9 This increase in the ability of an innocent owner to
defend against the seizure of his or her property is a step toward
recognizing due process and property rights, and a step away from
the employment of the personification fiction to circumvent these

rights.
CAFRA continues to employ the legal fiction that the property,
and not the person, is on trial. At the same time, however, the
statute implicitly recognizes the fallacy of the personification
fiction and seeks to protect owners by increasing their due process
and property rights. The statute also explicitly encourages the use
of criminal forfeiture as an alternative to civil forfeiture, thereby
decreasing the number of forfeitures that would occur without a
criminal trial and the constitutional protections that go along with
it.

2 10

Although CAFRA represents an important reform of forfeiture
law, Congress and the courts would do well to bear in mind the
important due process consideration that the personification fiction
conceals by shifting the burden of proof in civil forfeiture
proceedings. 21 1 Once the government has met its burden of proof raised to a preponderance of the evidence by CAFRA - the
presumption of innocence is reversed and the burden of proof is on
the claimant to show that the property was not connected to any
illegal activity.2 12 The claimant is left with the often insurmountable
burden of proving innocence by a preponderance of the evidence
because, as the fiction prescribes, it is the property itself and not
the owner who is on trial. 213 Because there is no criminal trial
following the preponderance determination, the government enjoys
a considerable advantage. The owner is thus denied constitutionally
protected due process rights.
CAFRA does not do away with the personification fiction once
and for all, and thus, "the unfairness inherent in the system
remains: so long as innocence is an irrelevant consideration to the
2 14
question of whether property is guilty, injustices will continue."
However, CAFRA does represent a movement away from relying on
the legal fiction to seize the property of those who are innocent
under the law, and toward a recognition that civil forfeiture has
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

CAFRA § 983(d)(2)(B)(ii).
CAFRA § 2461(c).
LEvy, supra note 3, at 194.
CAFRA § 983(c)(1); LEvY, supra note 3, at 194.
LEv, supra note 3, at 194.
Id. at 160.
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real, and sometimes devastating, consequences to the owners of the
property. If justice is to prevail, individual rights require real
protections. It will be fascinating to see how the cases coming
under the new law will be decided and interpreted in terms of the
legal fictions this article has discussed.
CONCLUSION

Congressman Conyers' proposal would eradicate the in rem legal
fiction in civil forfeiture cases altogether, and if ever adopted,
would be a powerful safeguard for all of our constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, with CAFRA and its heightened concern for the
reality beneath the fiction of forfeiture, Congress has drawn closer
to that ultimate goal. Certain other fictions, such as the virtual
impossibility of proving the innocent owner defense under Pearson
Yacht, have now been exposed, debated, and discussed in
Congress, and serious ameliorative alterations have been passed
into law.
Even as the debates continue about the nature of our legal
fictions today, we can appreciate the clarity the civilians brought to
their debates over legal fictions hundreds of years ago. Much of
this discussion and controversy has never been acknowledged by
our courts, and this has allowed the courts to steal some of our
most cherished rights under cover of darkness. At the same time,
our legislatures and our courts have failed to categorize or define
terms and, by this willful blindness, have failed to follow their
responsibilities to all of us in a free and democratic republic to
explain the precedent for forfeitures. This article has attempted to
demonstrate that they have not adequately explained the
justification for civil forfeitures and the erosion of our
constitutional rights.
It remains to be seen how far the trend begun by CAFRA will
continue. As it is, hundreds of thousands, and perhaps millions, of
Americans have had their property stolen and their most
fundamental rights violated. Perhaps one day, as the historical
definition and structure of the legal fictions becomes more
apparent, there will be a discussion of possible legislative or
judicial remedies for the property that has already been taken.
Legal fictions will always play an important part in our courts,
but their appearances should be brief and supplemental in nature.
In sum, the courts would do well to maintain some contact with
reality. As the civilians observed, the legal fiction should be only
temporary, lawful, possible, and an irrebutable assumption that
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does not attack and nullify the fundamental laws. The legal fiction
that best serves us acts as a temporary bridge from one law to the
next - not as a law unto itself.

